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Notes
Minnesota Business Corporations Act: Greater
Freedom for Corporations
I. INTRODUCTION
The new Minnesota Business Corporations Act' (new Act)
modernizes Minnesota law to meet the needs of contemporary
local businesses. The prior law, 2 the second oldest body of
state business corporation law in the nation, 3 was inflexible,
confusing, and unresponsive to the needs of modem businesses. 4 For example, although closely-held businesses comprise ninety percent of the business corporations in
Minnesota, 5 prior law made no distinction between publiclyowned and closely-held businesses. The old law mandated procedures and requirements that reflected archaic notions of operating publicly-owned businesses, and ignored the special
needs of closely-held corporations. These outmoded procedures and requirements prohibited shareholders and corporate
managers from adopting contemporary business practices. In
addition, because prior law often forced new business corporations to incur high legal costs during their formation, 6 many
businesses either did not incorporate or feigned compliance
7
with the statutory requirements.
In response to these deficiencies, the Minnesota Advisory
Task Force on Corporation Law8 drafted Chapter 302A. The
1. Act of May 27, 1981, ch. 270, 1981 Minn. Laws 1141 (codified at MIEN.
STAT. §§ 302A.001-.917 (Supp. 1981)).
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 300.01-.84, 301.01-.98 (1980).
3.

See REPORT TO THE SENATE BY THE ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON CORPORA-

TION LAw (1980), reprinted in MIN. STAT. ANN. ch. 302A, at VII (West Supp.
1982) [hereinafter cited as ADViSORY Comm. REP.]. For example, prior law generally ignored the development of federal and state securities laws and rules.
Id at X.
4. See ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 3, at IX.
5. See ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 3, at VIIM

6. See ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 3, at IX-X.
7. For example, formalities such as annual shareholders' meetings, see
MINN. STAT. § 301.25(2) (1980), forced small firms with only one or two shareholders to go to the expense and bother of holding meetings and keeping
records or faking compliance with the statute.
8. See ADVISORY Cou. REP., supra note 3, at VIL:
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proposed Act was signed into law on May 27, 1981, and became
effective on July 1, 1981. 9 By January 1, 1984, Chapter 302A will
govern the activities of almost all businesses incorporated in
Minnesota.l 0
Chapter 302A attempts to encourage the formation of new
business corporations within the state by providing "the greatest degree of flexibility and the most clear cut recognition of
contemporary business needs and practices."" In addition,
Chapter 302A revises the rules governing corporate formation,
governance, and dissolution to make them more consistent
with contemporary business practices. For example, the new
Act eliminates many needless and potentially expensive formalities. New corporations need no longer file long and intricate articles of incorporation. Chapter 302A only requires the
articles to contain the name and address of the corporation, the
name of its registered agent, the number of shares available for
12
issuance, and the names and addresses of the incorporators.
The new Act also provides a checklist of provisions that the incorporators may desire to include in the articles of incorporation, thus saving many small businesses the unnecessary
The Advisory Task Force on Minnesota Corporation Law was formed
because of a mounting concern that the corporation laws governing
Minnesota business corporations are technically and substantively deficient, out of date, and a source of confusion and frustration in the
modern business world for shareholders, directors, officers, creditors,
governmental agencies, lawyers, and the courts.
Id. The Task Force was composed of thirteen attorneys, aided by one ful-time
staff member, several part-time research assistants, several members of the
Minnesota Bar, and the comments and criticism of practitioners and professors
across the nation. See id. at V-VII.
INN.STAT. § 302A.021(2) (Supp. 1981).
9.
10. Minnesota corporations prior to the enactment of Chapter 302A were
governed by either Minnesota Statutes Chapter 301, which originated in 1933
Minn. Laws, ch. 300, or Chapter 300, which originated in 1858 Minn. Laws, ch. 55.
The 1933 Act permitted businesses incorporated under Chapter 300 to elect to
remain under Chapter 300. Id. § 301.60 (1980). The drafters of the 1981 Act
doubted whether Chapter 300 corporations that never became governed by
Chapter 301 could be forced to accept Chapter 302A, since Chapter 300 contained no reservation of power to subject corporations formed thereunder to future amendments. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.021 reporter's notes (West Supp.
1982). The new Act thus exempts Chapter 300 corporations from its application.
All other Minnesota corporations may elect to come under Chapter 302A until
January 1, 1984, when non-electing corporations become subject to the new law.
MIN. STAT. § 302A.021(7) (Supp. 1981).
11. ADVISORY Comm.REP., supra note 3, at X,
12. MINN.STAT. § 302A.111(1) (Supp. 1981). In contrast, prior law required
a statement of business purpose or purposes, the duration of the business, a
description of each class of stock, and the minimum amount of stated capital
with which the corporation begins business. Id. § 301.04 (1980).
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expense of hiring counsel.' 3
Chapter 302A facilitates the governance of both closelyheld and publicly-held businesses by granting the board of directors broad discretion in corporate management.' 4 The authority of the board of directors may now be vested in
executive or other committees of the board.15 The new Act
modifies the directors' statutory duty of care by allowing them
to rely upon the information and advice of officers or employees believed to be "reliable and competent"; directors can also
rely on counsel, public accountants, and others who have pertinent "professional or expert competence."1 6 In addition, Chapter 302A allows directors to conduct the business without
holding meetings; if the articles so authorize, the board may act
7
on the written authorization of its members.'
The new Act also allows shareholders to assume responsibilities for corporate management. Upon unanimous vote, the
shareholders may undertake the function of the board of directors.' 8 This provision allows a sole shareholder to directly
manage the corporation. 9 Moreover, shareholder groups may
13. Id. § 302A.111(2)-(4) (Supp. 1981). The checklist specifies the required
provisions for the articles. Id. § 302A.111(1). In addition, the checklist enumerates all of the provisions of Chapter 302A that govern a corporation unless modified by the articles, id. § 302A.111(2), lists provisions of the law governing a
corporation that the articles or bylaws may modify, id. § 302A.111(3), and lists
those provisions of the law relating to the management and regulation of the
corporation not otherwise applicable to the corporation that the articles or bylaws may include. Id. § 302A.111 (4). The net effect of the checklist is to provide
shareholders, subscribers, and incorporators a greater "opportunity to influence the future of the corporation." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.111 reporter's
notes (West Supp. 1982).
14. ADVIsoRY Comi. REP., supra note 3, at X1H.
15. MmN. STAT. § 302A.241(1) (Supp. 1981). The former law only permitted
the board to appoint an executive committee. Id. § 301.28 (1980). Under Chapter 302A, the board may delegate any part of its power of management to any
committee of its choosing, while retaining the ultimate power over that committee. Id. § 302A.241(1) (Supp. 1981). The committee of disinterested persons
under section 302A.243 represents the one exception to this provision. Id.
§§ 302A.241(1), .243. See also infra notes 125-83 and accompanying text.
16. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(2) (a) (Supp. 1981). This "safe harbor" provision
recognizes that a director of a modern corporation may not be able to personally discover and collect all of the necessary facts to discharge his or her duties:
MiN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). A director's actions are protected only if the director actually relied upon the information, and
the information relied upon was within the field of the expert's competence.
Id.
17. MINN. STAT. § 302A.239(1) (Supp. 1981).
18. Id. §302A.201(2).

19. The new Act also allows a sole shareholder to be the only director of
the corporation. Id. § 302A.203. A sole shareholder who is a natural person
could also directly manage the corporation by becoming the sole director. Id.
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enter into agreements relating to the voting of their shares 20 or
21
the control of any phase of the corporation's business.
Although Chapter 302A provides management with substantially more freedom, it also protects shareholders by increased disclosure requirements. For example, under the new
Act, the corporation, upon written demand, must allow a shareholder access to records of board and shareholders' meetings,
all articles and bylaws currently in effect, financial statements
distributed to shareholders or governmental agencies as a matter of record, reports to shareholders within the last three
years, voting trust and shareholder control agreements, and the
share register.22 The shareholder's particular intent or purpose
in obtaining access to this information is irrelevant. 23 In addition, a shareholder can inspect any other records if he or she
24
has a "proper purpose."
The new Act incorporates four other provisions that significantly affect both newly-formed and existing businesses incorporated in Minnesota. These provisions allow courts to order a
mandatory buy-out,25 bar most claims not fied within one year

of corporate dissolution,2 6 authorize a special litigation commit§§ 302A.203 (board consists of "one or more directors"); 302A.205 (director must

be natural person).
20. Id. § 302A.455.

21. Id. § 302A.457(l). Courts had traditionally regarded such agreements
as impermissible infringements on the power of the board of directors. See McQuade v. Stoneham & McGraw, 263 N.Y. 323, 330, 189 N.E. 234, 237 (1934). But
see Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 415-17, 199 N.E. 641, 642-43 (1936) (criticizing
use of McQuade rationale when all shareholders had entered into control
agreement).
22. MmuN. STAT. § 302A.461(4) (Supp. 1981).
23. Under the old law, a shareholder had to show a "proper purpose" prior
to inspection of any documents. Id. § 301.34(5) (1980).
24. Id. § 302A.461(4) (b) (Supp. 1981). The new Act defines a "proper purpose" as "one reasonably related to the person's interest as a shareholder, beneficial owner, or holder of a voting trfist certificate of the corporation." Id. The
reporter's notes indicate that this section adopts the Delaware definition of
"proper purpose" and corresponding case law while effecting no change in the
definition of "proper purpose" set forth by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
MIN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.461 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). See Founes v.
Hubbard Broadcasting, 302 Minn. 471, 473, 225 N.W.2d 534, 536 (1975); Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 263, 87 N.W.2d 671,
679-80 (1958). The reporter's notes do indicate, however, that the "standard set
forth in State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, 291 Minn. 322, 327, 191 N.W.2d 406,
410 (1971) of 'investment return' ought to be interpreted broadly." MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.461 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
25. MIN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 29-90 and accompanying text.
26. Mnr. STAT. § 302A.781 (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 91-124 and accompanying text.
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tee,2 7 and allow corporate merger without a business purpose.2 8
The remainder of this Note discusses each of these provisions
ingreater detail.
I. COURT-ORDERED BUY-OUT
Chapter 302A significantly expands the equitable relief
available to minority shareholders in closely-held corporations
by authorizing a court-ordered sale of a party's interest.2 9 The
statute allows a court, at its discretion, to order a buy-out of
shares in a closely-held corporation.3 0 A buy-out order may issue upon the motion of the corporation, a shareholder, or a
27. MmN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 125-83 and accompanying text
28. MNN. STAT. § 302A.601-.661 (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 184-228 and accompanying text.
29. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981). The mandatory buy-out provision reads as follows:
In a case under subdivision 1, clause (b) [grounds for involuntary
dissolution], involving a corporation having 25 or fewer shareholders,
upon motion of a corporation, or of a shareholder or beneficial owner of
shares of the corporation, a court of competent jurisdiction may order
the sale by a plaintiff or a defendant of all shares of the corporation
held by the plaintiff or defendant to either the corporation or the moving shareholders, whichever is specified in the motion, if the court determines in its discretion that an order would be fair and equitable to
all parties under all of the circumstances of the case.
The purchase price of any shares so sold shall be the fair value of
the shares as of the date of the commencement of the action or as of
another date found equitable by the court.
The purchase price shall be paid in one or more installments as
agreed on by the parties, or, if no agreement can be reached, as ordered by the court. Upon entry of an order for the sale of shares under
this subdivision and provided that the corporation or the moving shareholders post a bond in adequate amount with sufficient sureties or
otherwise satisfy the court that the full purchase price of the shares,
plus such additional costs, expenses, and fees as may be awarded will
be paid when due and payable, the selling shareholders shall no longer
have any rights or status as shareholders, officers, or directors, except
the right to receive the fair value of their shares plus such other
amounts as might be awarded.
Jd If the parties are unable to agree on fair value within 40 days of the entry of
the court order, section 302A.751(2) provides that "the court shall determine
the fair value of the shares under the provisions of section 302A.473, subdivision 6," referring to the section providing for a dissenting shareholder's demand for payment according to his or her estimate of the shares' value. The
accompanying reporter's note implies that the appraisal procedure in section
302A.473(7) will be used to determine value of the shares.
mInNw.
STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751(2) reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
30. MuN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981). Since the court may order
either plaintiff or defendant to sell all their shares to the corporation or th
moving shareholders, it is possible for the court to order the buy-out of a majority shareholder by a minority shareholder. MINN.STAT. ANN.§ 302A.751(2) reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).

1038

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1033

beneficial owner, but only if the statutory grounds for involuntary dissolution are established.3 '
Oppressed minority shareholders in closely-held corporations may be forced to seek judicial relief because of the illiquidity of their investment in the corporation.32 The stock in a
close corporation is usually held by a few shareholders who
often are family members.3 3 Because transactions involving
sales of stock in closely-held corporations are rare, these shares
are relatively unmarketable; therefore, minority shareholders
34
are typically locked into their investments.
The marketability problem is especially harmful to minority shareholders in close corporations if the majority has lawfully excluded them from participation in the company. 35 If the
minority shareholder is a member of a typical close corporation
in which the shareholders are also the directors and the officers, the minority shareholder may be unable to prevent the
majority from acting against the minority's interest. Outvoted,
the minority is often forced to leave their investment under the
majority's control.36
31. MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981). See infra text accompanying
notes 63-72. A shareholder must bring suit for an involuntary dissolution under
section 302A.751(1) before the court may order a buy-out. The court then determines whether a buy-out order would be fair and equitable to all parties under
all of the circumstances of the case.
nmw. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
The decision to issue the buy-out order, however, falls under the court's discretion. Id.
32. See generally Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63
VA. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill..2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965). Professor Israels describes a close corporation as "a corporation where management and ownership are substantially identical to the extent that the
independent judgment of directors is, in fact, a fiction." Israels, The Sacred
Cow of CorporateExistence-The Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U.
Cm. L. REv. 778, 778 (1952).
34. See Field, Resolving ShareholderDisputes and Breaking Deadlocks in
the Close Corporation,58 MiNN. L. REV. 985, 986 (1974); Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 32, at 43.
35. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 43.
36. Id. See also Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 fll.2d 208, 170
N.E.2d 131 (1960). Often, as in the case of partnerships, the relations between
owners of a close corporation are compared to those of marriage partners. See,
e.g., Howe, Corporate Divorce: Deadlocks in the Close Corporation, 22 Bus.
LAw. 469, 469 (1967). Owners of closely-held corporations sometimes view
themselves as partners, and are looking for a sort of hybrid entity, which combines the advantages of partnership, particularly that of easy dissolution,
within the framework of a corporation. Partnership investments are more liquid than those in close corporations, however, because each partner has the
right to dissolve the firm, while a majority of voting shares is necessary for the
voluntary dissolution of a corporation. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note
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Minority shareholders in close corporations thus face many
hazards. The majority may drain off earnings through payment
of excessive salaries, bonuses, expense accounts, or other
fringe benefits. 37 Loans may be made to officers without adequate security. The -corporation may choose not to declare dividends, leaving minority shareholders without any return on
their investment. 3 8 The majority may sell the assets of the corporation without the assent of the minority, or may sell stock to
39
undesirable shareholders or competitors.
Prior to the enactment of the mandatory buy-out provision,
dissolution was the only statutory relief available in Minnesota
to dissatisfied minority stockholders. 40 Involunthry dissolution
is a drastic remedy, however, and traditionally courts have
been hesitant to dissolve a corporation,4 1 especially when its
business was prospering. 42 Moreover, the assets employed in a
business may have little value once it ceases to operate as a going concern. 43 Thus, involuntary dissolution may injure all the
shareholders as well as deprive the community and the economy of a viable business venture. 44
Although other jurisdictions provide alternatives to involuntary dissolution, these alternative remedies have proved in32, at 3. Moreover, it is more difficult to exclude minority partners from participation in the management of a partnership than a close corporation, because if
partners disagree, a majority of partners cannot legally prevent a minority partner from participating in the business, or from withdrawing a pro-rata share of
the partnership's earnings. Cf. Elson, ShareholdersAgreements, A Shield for
Minority Shareholdersof Close Corporations,22 Btis. LAw. 449, 452 (1967) (majority rule applies as to most corporate decisions); Note, Some Specific Needs of
the Close CorporationNot Met Under the Minnesota Business CorporationAct:
Some Suggestions for Statutory Relief, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1008, 1009 (1970)
(same).
37. See, e.g., Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1965).
38. The majority may be in a better financial position to weather long periods without dividends, or may not need dividends because the majority shareholders receive salaries as officers of the corporation. Cf. In re Radom &
Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) (president of a closely-held corporation ran the business, but the opposing fiction refused to sign his salary
checks, leaving him without any compensation for his services).
39. See Elson, supra note 36, at 450.
40. See MmNI. STAT. § 301.49-.50 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 227 Minn. 432, 442, 152
N.W.2d 758, 765 (1967) ("the court should grant the drastic remedy of dissolution with great caution and not in doubtful cases").
42. See W. CARY &M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
496 (5th ed. 1980); Howe, supra note 36, at 476.
43. See infra note 88. See also V. BRUDNEY &M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 34, 125 (2d ed. 1979).
44. See Fales, JudicialAttitudes Towards the Rights of Minority Stockholders, 22 Bus. LAw. 459, 462-63 (1967).
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adequate. Some jurisdictions authorize courts to appoint a
custodian empowered to carry on the business of the corporation for a period of time.45 A custodianship, however, imposes
a high cost on the judicial system.46 Moreover, this alternative
is merely temporary, and represents an extreme invasion of the
rights of shareholders opposing the custodian.47 The custodian
has no proprietary interest in the corporation, and thus has litie to gain from aggressive or innovative policies. Instead, the
custodian's concern is to forestall criticism and to maintain the
status quo. The inherent uncertainty regarding the tenure of
custodians hinders their dealings with customers, suppliers,
and employees.4 s Perhaps in recognition of the difficulties involved, the appointment of a custodian is a remedy employed
only rarely by the courts. 9
Some jurisdictions authorize the court to appoint a provisional director empowered to break deadlocks.50 This alternative does little to protect the interests of minority shareholders,
however, since the appointed director acts only when the voting shares of the corporation are divided equally between two
rival factions. 5 ' The appointment of a provisional director inevitably relegates some of the formerly equal shareholders to minority status.5 2 The other faction, having gained a majority of
one, may be able to make changes in the control structure of
the corporation that have a persisting effect even after the pro53
visional director is no longer sitting.
It is also unreasonable to expect agreements entered into
during the formation of the corporation to protect the minority
shareholders adequately. The parties often assume upon incorporation that they will be in substantial agreement as to the operation of the firm.5 4 If future disputes are unforeseen,
45.

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 226(a) (1974).

46. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 25 ('Temporary custodial
or judicially monitored management is costly to the judicial system and to the
parties, both in continuing legal expenses and in lost opportunities.").
47. I&
48. Id. at 25-26.
49. Id. at 23 n.64.
50. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 308, 1802 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE

ANN.tit. 8, § 353 (1974).
51. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 21.
52. Id. at 21-22.
53.

See W. CARY & AL EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 500. See also In re Jam-

ison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 322 P.2d 246 (1958), in which cumulative
voting allowed both the minority and majority factions to elect two directors.
The provisional director voted with the majority's two directors to increase the
board to five directors, thereby permanently altering the balance of power.
54. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 2, 36-37.
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shareholders' agreements may be ineffective or may never be
executed.55 The cost alone of retaining counsel to draft complex shareholders' agreements may preclude their use.
The mandatory buy-out provision responds to the shortcomings of involuntary dissolution and its alternatives. 56 Absent statutory authority, courts may be reluctant to order
intermediate relief short of involuntary dissolution.5 7 Because
an order of involuntary dissolution was rare,58 an oppressed minority shareholder in a close corporation could not be certain of
obtaining judicial relief. Under the new Act, minority shareholders may move for a court ordered purchase of their
shares, 59 or alternatively may move to have the corporation dissolved and its assets sold.60 If the court decides a buy-out is
equitable, the parties may either negotiate or litigate the value
6
of the shares in the corporation. 1
To obtain a court-ordered buy-out, a shareholder must initiate a suit and establish the grounds for involuntary dissolution. 62 The new Act broadens these grounds. Previously,
involuntary dissolution was available only upon a showing that:
corporate assets were insufficient to pay debts;63 the object of
the corporation had failed, been abandoned, or become impracticable;6 4 the directors were guilty of fraud, mismanagement,
55. See Field, supra note 34, at 985.
56. See Mnna. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
57. Id. But see Thwing v. McDonald, 134 Minn. 148, 153-54, 158 N.W. 820, 822
(1916), in which the court indicated that remedies short of dissolution should
be considered.
58. Cf. Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 227 Minn. 432, 442, 152 N.W.2d 758,
765 (1967) (courts hesitant to grant dissolution).
59. MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
60. Id. § 302A.751(1) (b).
61. Initially, the parties to the sale have the right to agree upon the fair
value of the shares. If they can agree upon the fair value within 40 days of the
court order, the court will accept the agreed-upon value as "fair." If no agreement is reached, the court will determine the fair value using the same method
it would use in an appraisal or dissenters' rights proceedings. Id. § 302A.751(2);
MmN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). For a discussion of how courts value businesses in appraisal or dissenters' rights proceedings, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREISTEIN, supra note 43, at 1-78. See alo In re
Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 435 (1941) ('The value derivable from [a company] as an operating entity is dependent in large Part upon the amount of
earnings to be obtained from the property as reorganized and the length of
time for which such earnings will be available."); Francis L DuPont & Co. v.
Universal Studios, 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973) (court used two factors, earnings
and assets, and assigned different weights to them in determining the value of
the enterprise).
62. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
63. Id. § 301.49(1) (1980).
64. Id. § 301.49(2). This ground has been eliminated under Chapter 302A,
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abuse of authority, or persistent unfairness towards minority
shareholders; 65 the shareholders were so deadlocked that the

business could not be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders;66 or, the prescribed duration of the corporation had expired without extension.67 Chapter 302A establishes several
additional grounds for involuntary dissolution, including waste
of corporate assets, 68 failure to elect directors,69 and corporate
admission of insolvency. 70 In addition, the new Act explicitly
allows involuntary dissolution of profitable corporations 7 l and

72
eliminates the deadlock requirement.
Although most of the grounds for involuntary dissolution
and mandatory buy-outs are relatively straightforward,7 3 the

exact meaning of persistent unfairness or oppression 74 remains

unsettled. One author used this definition:
"[B]urdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct," "a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its
members," or "a visual departure from the standards of fair dealing,
and a violation of fair play on which every 75shareholder who entrusts
his money to a company is entitled to rely."

This definition suggests that persistent unfairness is closely related to the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing which
id. § 302A.751(l) (b) (Supp. 1981), most likely because the requirement that a
corporation state a specific business purpose in its articles has been eliminated. Id. §§ 302A.101, .751(1) (b).
65. Id. § 301.49(3) (1980).
66. Id. § 301.49(4).
67. Id. § 301.49(5).
68. Id. § 302A.751(1) (b) (4) (Supp. 1981).
69. Id. § 302A.751(1)(b)(3).
70. Id. § 302A.751(1) (c) (2).
71. Id. § 302A.751(3).
72. Compare id. § 301.49(4) (1980) (old law) with id. § 302A.751(1) (b) (3)
(Supp. 1981) (new law).
73. Although any of the grounds for involuntary dissolution can support a
motion for a mandatory buy-out order, the ground of "persistent unfairness" is
probably both the most difficult to define and the most likely to be advanced by
a disgruntled minority shareholder in a close corporation. While deadlock is a
commonly advanced ground for dissolution, it is by its very terms inapplicable
in regard to protecting a minority interest, unless the articles require a supermajority, in which case the minority has more leverage than is normal in a
close corporation. The grounds of fraud, waste, and failure to elect directors
are relatively easy to define, and may be elements of a claim of "persistent unfairness." The ground of expiration of the period of duration is selfexplanatory.
74. Many statutes use the term "oppression" rather than "persistent unfairness" but the meaning of the terms are comparable. See W. CARY &M. EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 508.
75. Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DuxE L.J. 128, 134 (quoting Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y, Ltd. v.
Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71, 86 (HL); Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., 1952 Sess.
Cas. 49, 55 (Scot. 7th Div.)).
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majority shareholders owe to the minority.76 This definition
seems to justify a buy-out order if shareholders abuse their corporate positions for private gain or attempt to plunder a close
corporation by siphoning off profits through the payment of excessive salaries or bonuses. 7 7 Courts may also infer persistent
unfairness if the majority shareholders have refused to allow
the minority to participate in the affairs of the corporation. 78
Courts could look to, for example, majority refusals to consult
with the minority, refusals to put meritorious minority proposals into effect, or hostility towards the minority.79 In addition, a
court trying to assess whether the majority's persistent unfairness warrants a buy-out order should examine the reasonableness of the shareholder's expectations. A reasonable minority
shareholder's expectations will vary depending on the circumstances and the nature of the corporation. At the minimum,
shareholders expect to be dealt with honestly and to share in
the profits, but in some circumstances minority shareholders
may expect to have a significant voice in the management of
the corporation. 80 The term "persistent unfairness" affords
courts the latitude necessary to determine whether grounds for
dissolution or a buy-out exist in a variety of circumstances. 8 '
Although a buy-out order is contingent upon a showing of
the grounds for involuntary dissolution, courts should order
buy-outs upon a lesser showing than they require in an involuntary dissolution proceeding. Because a buy-out is a less
drastic remedy than an involuntary dissolution, courts should
be willing to order a buy-out in situations in which an involuntary dissolution would be inappropriate. 82 A court-ordered buy76.

Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 264 Or. 614, 629, 507 P.2d 387, 394

(1973).
77. See id.
78. Cf. In re Hedberg-Freidheim & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 536-39, 47 N.W.2d 424,
426-27 (1951) (parties owned the same number of shares, but one used his position to take control of the business and exclude the other). Although the court
found the plaintiff's allegations stated the grounds for persistent unfairness,
the court ordered dissolution on the grounds of deadlock. Id. at 539-40, 47
N.W.2d at 428.
79. A single act of misdeed may be insufficient, however, since the term
'"persistent unfairness" seems to contemplate a continuing course of conduct.
Persistent unfairness, however, is not synonymous with illegal or fraudulent
conduct, and the absence of mismanagement, or misapplication of assets, does
not prevent a finding of persistent unfairness or oppression. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 264 Or. 614, 628-30, 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1973).
80. See Comment, supra note 75, at 141.
81. See id.
82. Cf. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982)
('This section provides explicit statutory authority [to order buy-outs]; that authority is meant to be used."). The reporter also writes that "equitable relief
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out is an especially attractive alternative to dissolution when a
corporation is operating profitably. For example, in Thwing v.
McDonald83 the Minnesota Supreme Court was reluctant to order the involuntary dissolution of a solvent corporation, but
showed a willingness to investigate remedies short of dissolution. 84 The specific authority to grant intermediate relief given
the court by the new Act should encourage courts to grant relief in situations in which they were hesitant to do so in the
past.
The addition of the buy-out provision to the arsenal of remedies available to the court provides minority shareholders in
close corporations with much needed protection. Aside from
the benefit of increasing the liquidity of minority investments,
the buy-out provision diminishes the likelihood of majority exploitation, by providing the minority with a low cost, convenient remedy. 85 Since all parties know in advance that the
minority may have a legal right to withdraw its pro-rata portion
of the current value of the firm, a fair but nonjudicial settlement is more likely than under prior law. The possibility of a
court ordered buy-out thus reduces the majority's ability to extort concessions from the minority with the threat of involuntary dissolution. By discouraging exploitative behavior, the
new Act should save judicial resources and litigation costs, and
reduce the need for complex and costly private agreements involving control or stock purchase options. Since the majority
must pay a fair price for the minority's stock, it cannot appropriate the minority's interest at bargain rates. The majority,
therefore, can increase its own wealth only by increasing the
productivity of the firm. As exploitative behavior becomes less
profitable for the majority, the incentive to manage fairly and
86
efficiently increases.
The buy-out provision neither overprotects minority shareholders, nor allows them to extort disproportionate gains from
the majority. Because a buy-out order will issue only at the
court's discretion,87 the petitioner will most likely carry a sub[may be ordered] whenever the grounds for involuntary dissolution have been
established." Id. Nevertheless, provided that the court determines that the
buy-out order will be fair and equitable, see MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp.
1981), a prima facie case for involuntary dissolution should suffice to justify a
buy-out order.
83. 134 Minn. 148, 158 N.W.820 (1916).
84. Id. at 153-54, 158 N.W. at 822.
85. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 47.
86. See id. at 46-48.
87. See MmN.STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
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stantial burden of showing the transaction to be fair to all parties. If tie court finds that a buy-out order would be fair and
the minority's interest in the corporation is small, it can be easfly purchased by the majority. If the minority's interest is
large, it is unlikely to request dissolution. Minority shareholders have an incentive to avoid dissolution and negotiate a selling price with the majority, because the minority's share of the
corporation's going concern value is lost unless the business is
sold intact to a third party or the majority purchases its
interest. 88
It is also unlikely that the buy-out provision will have the
effect of depriving the community of viable businesses.8 9 Minority shareholders have little incentive to invoke their buy-out
right if the business is profitably, efficiently, and fairly managed. Since the majority can always liquidate voluntarily, it
presumably views liquidation as contrary to its own interests.
A shareholder who wishes to sell stock in a profitable business
should find a willing buyer in the majority who will prefer raising the necessary capital for purchasing the minority's interest
to liquidating the business. If the majority cannot purchase the
minority interest out of its own funds, it can borrow or solicit
new investors. Because the buy-out provision enhances the liquidity of investments in close corporations, outside investors
will be easier to attract. Moreover, as more investment capital
becomes available, the need to exercise the mandatory buy-out
will decrease; the minority will be able to sell its interest more
readily on the open market, obviating the need to resort to the
courts. Finally, since the minority can purchase the majority's
interest, it is even less likely that a mandatory buy-out will result in liquidation of the corporation. A business will be liquidated only if neither the majority nor anyone else finds the
business sufficiently profitable to continue. There is little social
cost in the demise of unprofitable businesses.9 0
The mandatory buy-out provision is an innovative solution
to the problem of minority illiquidity and exploitation in
closely-held corporations. It protects minority interests without unduly prejudicing the rights of the majority or subverting
the nature of close corporations. In addition, the new provision
88. "Frequently, the assets employed in a business have little extrinsic
value once the business is terminated and no longer operates as a going concern. Thus, dissolution tends in many instances to injure all stockholders, as
well as to deprive the community and the economy of a going business venture." Fales, supra note 44, at 462-63.
89. Hetherington &Dooley, supra note 32, at 49-50.
90. Id. at 50.
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should benefit the economy and the community by encouraging
investment opportunities and reducing court and transaction
costs.
III.

ONE YEAR CLAIM BAR

Chapter 302A bars, with one exception, claims by or against
a dissolved corporation that were not pending on the date of
dissolution. 91 Nevertheless, claims may be filed for one year after the filing of the articles of dissolution or the entry of a decree of dissolution if the creditor or claimant "shows good
cause for not having previously filed the claim." 92 In addition,
the Act does not bar claims resulting from obligations or liabilities incurred during dissolution.93 This new treatment sharply
contrasts with former Minnesota law, which held the dissolved
corporation 94open to suit for three years beyond the date of
dissolution.
The former Minnesota statutes were enacted to mitigate a
harsh common law doctrine. At early common law, the dissolution of a corporation abated all future claims against the corpo91. MINN. STAT. § 302A.781(1) (Supp. 1981). The entire section reads as
follows:
Subdivision 1. Claims barred. A creditor or claimant who does
not file a claim or pursue a remedy in a legal, administrative, or arbitration proceeding under sections 302A.729, 302A.741, 302A.751 or 302A.759,
or in some other legal, administrative, or arbitration proceeding pending on the date of dissolution, and all those claiming through or under
the creditor or claimant, are forever barred from suing on that claim or
otherwise realizing upon or enforcing it, except as provided in this section.
Subd. 2. Claims reopened. At any time within one year after articles of dissolution have been fied with the secretary of state, or a decree of dissolution has been entered, a creditor or claimant who shows
good cause for not having previously fied the claim may apply to a
court in this state to allow a claim:
(a) Against the corporation to the extent of undistributed assets;
or

(b) If the undistributed assets are not sufficient to satisfy the
claim, against a shareholder, whose liability shall be limited to a portion of the claim that is equal to the portion of the distributions to
shareholders in liquidation or dissolution received by the shareholder.
Subd. 3. Claims permitted. All debts, obligations, and liabilities
incurred during dissolution proceedings shall be paid by the corporation before the distribution of assets to a shareholder. A person to
whom this kind of debt, obligation, or liability is owed but not paid may
pursue any remedy against the officers, directors, and shareholders of
the corporation before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. This subdivision does not apply to dissolution under the supervision or order of a court.
Id. § 302A781.
92. Id. § 302A.781(2).
93. Id. § 302A.781(3).
94. The former Minnesota law was the result of the interaction of two sections. See MINN. STAT. §§ 300.59, 301.54(4) (1980).
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harsh common law doctrine. At early common law, the dissolution of a corporation abated all future claims against the corporation.9 5 Those creditors or claimants who had not filed their
claims prior to dissolution were forever barred. The common
law rule was in accord with the major goal of dissolution-to
provide a quick, certain, and final accounting of the business.9 6
Courts, rebelling against a lack of protection for legitimate
claimants, eventually allowed personal actions against the
shareholders and directors of a dissolved corporation on the basis of the "trust fund" theory.9 7 The courts reasoned that when
a corporation was dissolved, the assets became a "'trust fund
against which the corporate creditors have a...
claim' prior to
that of the shareholders or any transferee who is not a bona
fide purchaser."B A party claiming an obligation of the corporation could thus sue shareholders for the amount they received when the corporation was dissolved.99 In addition,
distributing directors were potentially liable in their capacities
as trustees for the creditors and shareholders for a breach of
fiduciary duty involving the dissolution. This liability was personal, and attached even though the director had recieved no
share of the assets of the dissolved corporation.10o
Thus, although the corporation was not itself open to suit, claimants
could obtain some limited relief.
Legislatures, through laws such as the former Minnesota
law' 0 ' and the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),102 ex95. Friedlander & Lannie, Post-DissolutionLiabilitiesof Shareholdersand
Directorsfor Claims Against Dissolved Corporations,31 VAND. L. REV. 1363,
1400 (1978); Wallach, ProductsLiability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-

The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on ProductDissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321, 323 (1976).
96. See MINN. STAT. Arm. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982);
16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8157-58
(rev. perm. ed. 1979). See also Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96
(N.D. Iowa 1968) (policy of a definite termination point "inherent" in
dissolution).
97. See Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at 1367; Norton, Relationship
of Shareholdersto Corporate Creditors Upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of CorporateAssets, 30 Bus. LAw. 1061, 1061
(1975); Note, Shareholder Liability Upon Liquidation of a Corporation, 46
UMKC L. REv. 454, 461 (1978).
98. Friedlander &Lannie, supra note 95, at 1367 (quoting 16A W. FLETCHER,

supra note 96, § 8161 at 371; Norton, supra note 97, at 1061-72).
99. Note, supra note 97, at 466.
100. See Friedlander &Lannie, supra note 95, at 1368.
101. MmNN. STAT. §§ 300.59, 301.54 (1980). The effects of this type of statutory
section on the liability of shareholders and directors under the "trust fund"
theory is not entirely clear, although one view holds that the time limit in the
statute also bars "trust fund" actions. Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at
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panded claimant rights by allowing suit against the corporation
if the action were commenced within a specified time period after dissolution. The former Minnesota law provided that to
conclude its affairs the corporation would continue to exist for
three years following dissolution. 0 3 The result of this law was a
three year grace period in which to press claims against the
dissolved corporation. The MBCA provides that claimant rights
against the corporation would continue for two years.104 In addition, several states have enacted statutes patterned after the
MBCA which provide up to five years to press claims. 05
New Jersey statutes, which are the model for Minnesota's
new claim-bar provision,10 6 codify claimant rights against both
the shareholders and the corporation. 0 7 New Jersey law provides that a claimant, who shows good cause for not having
filed before dissolution, may press a claim against a dissolved
corporation or a shareholder who received a portion of the assets of the liquidated corporation.X08 As one commentator
noted,109 this provision seems to hold open perpetually shareholder liability for contingent claims, such as claims for product defects or breached warranties." 0 Because such claims
may not mature until years after the original purchase of the
product,"' any claimant suing shortly after maturation, but
many years after the dissolution, could easily show good cause
for the lateness of the claim. The commentator therefore suggested that the statute be amended by affixing an absolute time
limit beyond which claims would be barred.n2
Chapter 302A embodies a response to that suggestion by
including an absolute bar to all claims fied more than one year
after dissolution. The expressed purpose of the new one year
1381. The bar on "trust fund" actions seems to be in accord with the policy of
finality underlying these statutes. Id. at 1401.

102. MODEL BusmnEss CORP. AcT § 105 (1979).
103. MINN. STAT. § 300.59 (1980).
104. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 105 (1979).
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-203 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1014
(1979). See also Wallach, supra note 95, at 325.
106. MiNN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
107. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:12-13 (West Supp. 1981-82).
108. Id.
109. Kessler, The New Jersey Business CorporationAct: Some Effects of the
1974 Amendments on Close Corporations,28 RUT. L. REV. 96, 111 (1974).
110. Contingent liabilities may be defined as those which had not yet arisen
at dissolution. The underlying obligation is not due and payable at the time of
dissolution. The former Minnesota law provided that contingent claims were
not subject to the three year time limit. Mrm. STAT. § 301.54(4) (1980).
111. Kessler, supra note 109, at 111; Wallach, supra note 95, at 325-26.
112. Kessler, supra note 109, at 111.
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time limit is to "provide some incentive for creditors and claimants to file their claims at the time that other claims are being
processed."" 3 The corporation thus receives notice prior to dissolution of virtually all claims against it, and may promptly pay
legitimate claims and resist others.
The new Act allows plaintiffs to pursue claims fied within
one year of the dissolution only for "good cause."11 4 According
to the reporter's notes, good cause includes circumstances in
which the claimant never received notice of dissolution or the
claim did not arise until the dissolution was complete;" 5 in
these circumstances, the trial court retains discretion to hear
the claim." 6 The absolute one year time limit thus promotes
certainty and timely filing of claims."17 In addition, if an action
against the corporation would be allowed but would not yield
enough to satisfy the claim," 8 the claimant may also sue the
shareholders.11 9 The dissolution process is thereby in accord
with the main goal of dissolution "to end the corporate exist20
ence as quickly and neatly as possible."'
The statute's treatment of matured obligations arising prior
to dissolution strikes a fair balance between the corporation's
interest in the expeditious termination of its affairs and litigants' interests in pursuing claims against the corporation.
Claimants whose claims mature prior to dissolution should receive sufficient notice to enable them to file before dissolution;
claimants who do not receive notice may file claims for one
113.
114.
115.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
MINN. STAT. § 302A.781(2) (Supp. 1981).
Mm. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).

116. Id.
117. Id.
ImN. STAT. § 302A.781(2) (b) (Supp. 1981). The statute specifies the or118.
der in which defendants can be sued. A shareholder is not open to suit unless
the remaining assets of the corporation are inadequate to satisfy the claim. Id.
119. The maximum liability of shareholders in any suit is "limited to a portion of the claim that is equal to the portion of the distributions to shareholders
in liquidation or dissolution received by the shareholder." MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.781(2) (b) (Supp. 1981). The Task Force clarified this language with an
example showing that a shareholder receiving 15% of the distribution is liable
for the lesser of either the amount received in distribution or 15% of the judgment recovered by the claimant. MitNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes
(West Supp. 1981).
The statute places no liability on directors. The policies underlying statutes which bar claims indicate that director liability under the "trust fund" theory has no continuing vitality. See generally Friedlander & Lannie, supra note

95.
120.

M'NN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982); cf.

Friedlander &Lannie, supra note 95, at 1401 (survival statute intended to protect certainty and definiteness, as well as to protect certain claims).
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year after dissolution, because the failure to receive notice
12 1
should constitute good cause for filing late.
The failure of the new Act to preserve litigants' contingent
claims beyond the one year time limit presents a larger problem. Because the claim would not arise until after the expiration of the absolute time limit, the claimant has no r~course
against the dissolved corporation or its shareholders.122 In
some instances, the effect of this rule may be unjust-valid
claimants will be denied a remedy. Nevertheless, there is some
justification for barring contingent claims after some essentially arbitrary time limit has elapsed. The purpose underlying
corporate dissolution is analogous to the settlement of the estate of a decedent.123 The overall goal in both types of proceedings is finality. The heirs of a deceased person are usually not
responsible for the liabilities of the deceased once the estate is
settled.124 The uncertainty involved in allowing such claims is
simply not acceptable. By analogy, the possibility that a claim
against a dissolved corporation could arise decades later involves too much uncertainty for the shareholders. The uncertainty simply outweighs the gain provided by such a remedy.
The analogy between the dissolution of a corporation and
the closing of a decedent's estate is, however, not perfect. Although heirs taking from an estate probably committed no conscious acts to become heirs, shareholders usually make a
conscious decision to become. involved with the corporation.
The shareholders may well have received increased dividends
due to the business activity giving rise to the contingent claim.
In addition, shareholders normally enjoy a continuous economic interest in the corporation and benefit from their limited
liability as shareholders. Although a policy allowing contingent
claims at any time after the dissolution involves too much uncertainty, the one year time bar is too restrictive; a longer peThe
riod is necessary to protect contingent claimants.
legislature should therefore consider amending the statute to
121. Claims that mature just before the end of the statutory time period
may be barred if not filed immediately. While the result may seem unjust, it is
an unavoidable consequence of any absolute time bar.
122. Chapter 302A also protects the purchasers of the assets of a dissolved
corporation from liability. Mmii. STAT. § 302A.661(4) (Supp. 1981). Under section 302A.661(4), the purchaser would be liable for such claims only if the
purchase agreement provided for that liability. See generally Wallach, supra

note 95, at 335-45.
123. See Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927); Wallach,
supra note 95, at 324.
124. See 273 U.S. at 259.
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reach a more equitable balance between the shareholders' interests in the finality of dissolution and contingent claimants'
interests in recovery.
IV.

SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE

Chapter 302A specifically authorizes the creation of a special litigation committee,125 composed of "disinterested" per26
sons, who may or may not be directors of the corporation.
The committee is empowered to dismiss suits-including

shareholder's derivative suits-brought on behalf of a corporation, 127 if the committee finds that pursuing the suit is not "in
the best interest of the corporation."' 28 When a litigation committee dismisses a suit, it is expected to set forth specific, business-related reasons supporting the conclusion that the suit is
not in the best interests of the corporation.129 If the committee
makes its decision in good faith, the decision is final and binds
the corporation and shareholders unless a court finds that the
125. MIN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981). The provision authorizing the creation of a special litigation committee reads as follows:
Unless prohibited by the articles or bylaws, the board may establish a committee composed of two or more disinterested directors or
other disinterested persons to determine whether it is in the best interests of the corporation to pursue a particular legal right or remedy of
the corporation and whether to cause the dismissal or discontinuance
of a particular proceeding that seeks to assert a right or remedy on behalf of the corporation. For purposes of this section, a director or other
person is "disinterested" if the director is not the owner of more than
one percent of the outstanding shares of, or a present or former officer,
employee, or agent of, the corporation or of a related corporation and
has not been made or threatened to be made a party to the proceeding
in question. The committee, once established, is not subject to the direction or control of, or termination by, the board. A vacancy on the
committee may be filled by a majority vote of the remaining members.
The good faith determinations of the committee are binding upon the
corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders. The committee terminates when it issues a written report of its determinations.
Id.
The new Act significantly expands the ability of corporations to create committees governing all aspects of corporate activity. Although former law permitted the appointment of an executive committee, it required unanimous
board approval before the committee could act. MINN. STAT. § 301.28(4) (7)
(1980). The new Act requires only a majority vote. Any number of committees
may be created for any purpose. Committee members need not be directors of
the corporation. With the exception of the litigation committee, however, all
committees are subject to the control of the board of directors. See id.
§§ 302A.241, 302A.243 (Supp. 1981).
126. See supra note 125.
127. Shareholder's derivative suits are the primary example of suits
brought on behalf of the corporation.
128. MIN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981).
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.243 reporter's note (West Supp. 1982).
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committee was not independent and objective. 3 0 Upon such a
finding, a court presumably will order the reinstatement of the

suit.131
The shareholder's derivative suit developed as an equitable
32
remedy to check abuses of power by corporate management.1
Corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders, which requires them to discharge their management duties in good faith.133 The directors appoint officers, who
have some discretion but are expected to effectuate the policies
of the board.134 Shareholders usually bring derivative suits
against corporate officers or directors for alleged misconduct in
the performance of their corporate duties.135 The shareholder,
however, is only a nominal plaintiff; the cause of action and any
36
recovery belong to the corporation.
Although a shareholder may bring a derivative suit to remedy directors' or officers' misconduct, derivative suits are often
abused. Although the rationale behind derivative suits is to
check abuses of corporate management, derivative suits are
130. Id. See also Note, The Business Judgment Rule and the LitigationCommittee: .The End of a Clear Trend in Corporate Law, 14 IND. L. REV. 617, 635-36
(1981).
131. See Mnm. STAT. § 302A.243 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
132. See Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivations, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957).
133. See Note, supra note 130, at 618. See also Mum. STAT. § 302A.251(1)
(Supp. 1981), which defines the good faith'standard of conduct for directors as
follows:
A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good
faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. A
person who so performs those duties is not liable by reason of being or
having been a director of the corporation.
134. See, e.g., Mmw. STAT. § 302A.311 (Supp. 1981); Elson, supra note 36, at
452.
135. See Nornstein, The Counsel Fee in Shareholder's Derivative Suits, 39
COLum. L. REV. 784, 797 (1939) (finding that in nearly all successful derivative
suits defendants included one or more directors or officers of corporation).
136. Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 569, 33 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1948).
Shareholder's derivative suits may be initiated for various purposes. A shareholder may seek to -enjoin the corporation from engaging in certain conduct,
see, e.g., Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); or to challenge a
certain transaction, see, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 413"A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980); or to pursue an unasserted corporate claim against third parties, see, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
331 (1855). Although any monetary recovery belongs to the corporation, a large
recovery could significantly increase the value of a shareholder's interests in
the corporation. In addition, shareholders are usually indemnified for the costs
of bringing suit. Shareholders may thus bring suits merely to harass a corporation, or to recover attorney's fees.
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sometimes used as a vehicle for corporate extortion. 3 7 These
so-called strike suits often are brought by plaintiffs who are
pursuing something other than the corporation's best interests. 3 8 A single dissident shareholder, owning only one share
of stock, may file a derivative suit for its nuisance value alone.
Because plaintiffs in derivative suits usually recover costs and
attorney's fees, unscrupulous attorneys may initiate suits for
the sole purpose of realizing large fees.139 A shareholder of a
rival corporation may acquire a single share of stock and initiate a suit to harass or embarrass a competitor.140
Even if a suit is brought by a well-meaning shareholder,
there is no reason to believe that a minority shareholder is
more likely to act in the best interest of the corporation than
are the directors who are elected by a majority of stockholders.1 41 Shareholders often lack corporate information, and may
not have a realistic conception of the corporation's best interests.142 A shareholder may, through the medium of a derivative
137. See generally Note, Extortionate CorporateLitigation: The Strike Suit,
34 CoLUm. L. REV. 1308 (1934).
138. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). See
generally Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to Stockholder Proxy Derivative Suits under the Securities and Exchange Act, 8 SEC.
REG. L. J.99, 100 (1980).
139. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 979:
As a practical matter, the engine that normally drives a derivative action involving a public held corporation is not the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff typically makes little or no investment
inthe action and stands to gain very little benefit. His attorney, on the
other hand, makes a very substantial investment (in the form of his
time and disbursements) and stands to reap a very substantial benefit
(in the form of a fee). This raises the unwholesome possibility that defendants may be able to make an improper settlement by giving their
acquiescence to an inflated fee in exchange for acquiescence by plaintiff's counsel to an inadequate corporate recovery.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (plaintiffs attorney agreed to dismiss Securities Exchange Act § 16(b) action on condition that defendant pay him $2,500 for legal services); Jamison v.
Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (proposed settlement of class
action involved no benefit to the class but called for payment by defendants of
$50,000 attorneys' fee).
140. Private settlements, even though prohibited by statute, see, e.g., Mm.
R. Civ. PRO. 23.06 (requiring prior court approval of settlements), may still
make it possible for a plaintiff to profit from a nuisance suit if a secret settlement goes undiscovered. Moreover, the rules requiring court approval of settlements do not apply to derivative suits threatened but not filed. See Dent, The
Powerof Directorsto Terminate ShareholderLitigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 137-40 (1980).
141. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1980).

142. See F. WOOD,

SuRVEY AND REPORT REGARDING SHAREHOLDER'S DERIVA-

TIVE Surrs 45-47 (1944). The problem is exacerbated, since shareholders deciding whether to pursue corporate claims are not burdened by fiduciary duties

like those of a director.
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suit, attempt to force a corporation to effectuate personally held
beliefs, or broad public policy goals, which are not necessarily
in the corporation's or the other shareholders' best interests.143
The traditional justification for allowing director or litigation committee dismissal of derivative suits has been the business judgment rule.144 Under the business judgment rule,
courts will not intervene in corporate decision making, if the directors exercise good faith judgments in an honest, unbiased,
and reasonable manner.145 The business judgment rule is
based on the courts' belief that shareholders' interests in a
business corporation are limited to preserving the value of
their investment. 4 6 Because directors are uniquely situated to
make business decisions, the rule presumes that business judgments are best left to their expertise, or to committees appointed by them, rather than to shareholders. Absent fraud or
illegality, shareholders should have no more right to challenge
the directors' decision to dismiss a derivative suit than to chal143. Cf. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d
406 (1971) (in suit for inspection of corporate books, shareholder's sole motivation for buying stock in a company was to attempt to change the course of the
company's business, because the company's course of business was incompatible with his political views).
144. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (D. Minn. 1978),
a.fOd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
145. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979). Directors are insulated from personal liability for
acts within the scope of their management duties so long as they act in good
faith. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. § 302A.251(1) (Supp. 1981). In Minnesota, directors
act in good faith when they perform their duties in a manner which they reasonably believe "to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances." Id. Thus, a court will not hold a director liable for honest errors or mistakes of judgment, and directors are not held to be guarantors
of their companies' success. Otherwise, few, if any, individuals would be willing to become directors. See Chaplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Programfor the Exercise of Due Care, 1 J. Cosp. L 57, 59 (1975); see also
Note, supra note 130, at 621.
146. See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824
(S.D.N.Y. 1979):
A derivative action is designed to redress wrongs to the corporation
and not wrongs to the public. If the directors legitimately determine
that such an action will not benefit the corporation, then, regardless of
the illegality of the underlying transaction, the business judgment rule
permits termination of the suit.
Id. Courts thus acknowledge that the fundamental purpose of a business corporation is to make money for its shareholders; neither the corporation nor its
shareholders are guardians of the public. See id. Moreover, if a shareholder
disagrees with a decision of the directors or a committee appointed by the
board, the shareholder can vote against the directors at the next election, or
sell his or her interest in the corporation.
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lenge any other business decision of the board of directors.147
The business judgment rule therefore recognizes that courts
8
should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors.14
There are several reasons why courts traditionally defer to
directors' business decisions. State law places the responsibility of management on the board of directors;14 9 it would therefore be unfair to allow a court, which is totally unaccountable
to the shareholders, to second-guess decisions of the directors.150 Moreover, because derivative claims, even against corporate directors, belong to the corporation itself,' 5 ' the decision
whether and to what extent to explore and to prosecute such
claims lies within the business judgment of the board of directors. 5 2 Like other questions of corporate policy and manage-

ment, the decision to dismiss a claim involves weighing and
balancing a variety of factors to determine what course of action or inaction best advances the interests of the corporation
and its shareholders.153 These decisions are the very kind of
decisions that directors are required to make, and courts, therefore, should not "intrude to interfere.' 5 4 In addition, courts
may lack the training or expertise necessary to pass judgments
5
on complex business decisions.15
The authorization of a special litigation committee to review derivative suits reflects a clear trend in the federal
courts. 56 In Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,157 for example, the
147. See Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957). Moreover,
courts generally assume that directors act honestly. See Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cim L. REV.
168, 192 (1976).
148. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
149. See MUNN. STAT. § 302A.201 (Supp. 1981).
150. See Note, supra note 130, at 621. See also Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead
Co., 84 Misc. 278, 283, 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (1914) (quoting Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 99, 25 N.E. 201, 208 (1890)).
151. See Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 569, 3 N.W.2d 721, 724
(1948).
152. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Note, supra note 130, at 621.
156. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1979);
Note, supra note 130, at 630. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418
F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
157. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of a shareholder's derivative suit pursuant to a litigation committee's finding that the suit did not serve the best interests of
the corporation.'5 8 The suit alleged violations of the securities

laws stemming from illegal foreign payments made by several
directors and officers of Control Data. The corporation established a special litigation committee to investigate the charges.
After determining that the suit was not in the best interest of
the corporation, the committee directed counsel to move for
summary judgment. On appeal, the district court refused to
substitute its opinion for that of the special litigation committee and affirmed the grant of Control Data's motion. 5 9 Similarly, in Lewis v. Anderson16 0 the Ninth Circuit held that "the
good-faith exercise of business judgment by a special litigation
committee of disinterested directors is immune to attack by
shareholders or the courts."161
Some courts and commentators, however, question the propriety of allowing a committee appointed by the board of directors to terminate shareholder's derivative suits brought against
members of the board of directors.162 These authorities suggest
that directors will hesitate to recommend a suit against fellow
directors with whom they work and socialize, and question
whether a corporate litigation committee, appointed by the directors of a corporation, can ever be objective and unbiased in
reviewing the alleged wrongdoing of directors.163 In the recent
158. Id. at 727.
159. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Minn. 1978).
The court found that the business judgment rule applied to committee dismissal of shareholder derivative suits. Id. at 1245. The court went on to quote with
approval Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936). "Mere belief that corporate action, taken or contemplated, is illegal gives the [shareholder] no greater right to interfere than is
possessed by any other citizen. Stockholders are not guardians of the public.
The function of guarding the public against acts deemed illegal rests with public officials." 460 F. Supp. at 1246.
160. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
161. Id. at 783. The court characterized the application of the "business
judgment doctrine" as essentially an issue of standing. If the doctrine is applicable, then the plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Id.
162. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
163. See Dent, supra note 140, at 109-13 ("[T]he pressures on even nonimplicated directors are so great as to justify a conclusive presumption that they
cannot independently investigate and weigh the facts and reach a conclusion
that is in the best interest of the corporation."); Note, supra note 130, at 636-37
("An inside director's decision not to sue a fellow director may be influenced
by salary, promotion, fringe benefits, employee morale, and career consideration."). See also Lasker v. Burkes, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441
U.S. 471 (1979).
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case of Maldonado v. Flynn,164 for example, the court declined
to defer to the recommendations of a litigation committee. Instead, the court held that the power to dismiss a shareholder's
derivative action, based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
was not included in the powers of the board of directors to
manage the corporation.165 The court expressly limited its
holding, however, to cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty
on the part of directors. 6 6 Although Maldonado was reversed,1 67 the appellate court still reasoned that courts should
apply their own independent business judgment when determining whether to grant a litigation committee's motion to dismiss a derivative suit based on a director's breach of duty. 68
The Minnesota legislature, by enacting a statutory provision for the review of shareholder derivative suits by a litigation committee, apparently has determined that the advantages
of the business judgment rule outweigh its potential for abuse.
The legislature's determination is justified. Through the use of
a special litigation committee, corporations can effectively deal
with the potential abuses of strike suits. 69 In addition, the new
statute should benefit corporations faced with suits which, although not malicious, are not in the best interests of the
corporation.
Many situations may arise in which director or litigation
committee dismissal of a derivative suit brought in good faith is
legitimately in the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders. The prospects of a suit's success may be slim. Litigation costs may exceed any potential recovery.170 Unfavorable
or unwanted publicity may injure the corporation's reputation
164. 413 A.2d 1251 (DeL Ch.), appeal dismissed, 417 A.2d 278 (DeL Ch. 1980),
rev'd sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (DeL 1981).
165. 413 A.2d at 1257.
166. Id. at 1263.
167. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
168. Id. at 789. The court held that while an independent committee may
cause its corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss, the court should apply
a two-step test to the motion. First, the court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the reasons supporting its conclusion. If the court finds the committee was not independent or did not show
reasonable bases for its conclusions, the motion will be denied. Otherwise, the
court will take the second step and determine, applying its own independent
business judgment, whether the motion should be granted. Id. at 788-89.
169. According to the reporter's notes, the intent of the statute is to grant
corporations the ability to respond effectively to such suits. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.243 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
170. See Note, Corporations-TheStockholder's Independent Right to Sue.
Derivatively-Maldonado v. Flynn and Its Progeny, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 135, 136

(1980).
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and cause a drop in the market price of its stock. Similarly, derivative suits may demoralize management or distract it from
its duties, perhaps resulting in inefficiency and lower profits.
Finally, a corporation may simply prefer to apply its own internal sanctions to employee or director misconduct.171
Moreover, the fear that litigation committees simply will
dismiss all shareholder's derivative suits brought against members of the board of directors is unfounded. The statute imposes significant limitations on the composition and
deliberations of a litigation committee. Under the new Act,
members of a litigation committee must be "disinterested."'7 2
To be disinterested an individual cannot be a defendant to the
derivative suit, and cannot have been threatened to be made a
defendant to the suit. 7 3

Directors may serve on a litigation

committee, but only if they own less than one percent of the
outstanding shares in the corporation. 174 The committee must
be independent, and cannot be subject to the control of the
board of directors. 175 Finally, litigation committee decisions not
to sue must be made in "good faith," and the committee must
set forth specific business related reasons supporting its conclusion that the suit should be dismissed as being not in the
corporation's best interests.

76

Given these limitations, it is unlikely that a committee will
dismiss derivative suits involving legitimate shareholder grievances. Moreover, the decision to dismiss a derivative suit is not
immune from judicial review. The new Act shields the deliberations and conclusions of the committee only if its members
possess a disinterested independence and do not stand in a re7
lation that prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment. 7
Thus; a court may review and overturn a committee's determination if it is shown that the committee was not composed of
independent disinterested individuals.178 The statute only precludes reviewing courts from inquiring into the substantive de171.
172.

See, e.g., Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
MmN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981).

173, Id.
174.
175.
176.
1982).

Id.
Id.
Id. See also MmN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.243 reporter's notes (West Supp.
"Committees dismissing suits should be expected to set forth specific,

business-related reasons why the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation." Id.
177. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979).
178. Id.

1982]

BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

1059

cision whether to pursue a claim, because this necessarily
involves weighing commercial, promotional, ethical, and fiscal
factors that are common to the resolution of most corporate
problems.179 Such decisions are best left to the business judgment of a director-appointed committee. But courts may properly inquire into the adequacy and appropriateness of the
committee's investigative procedures and methodologies, since
these do not involve business decisions. 18 0 Cursory investigations that are shallow in scope or execution raise obvious questions of good faith 18 1 and are not shielded by Chapter 302A.
While according deference to the business judgment of director-appointed committee members, the limitation of judicial
review to an examination of the procedures, methodologies,
and potential interests of the committee also prevents judicial
review of committee decisions from becoming a vehicle for
strike suits. Although shareholders can litigate the procedural
aspects of a committee's decision to dismiss, the substantive
basis for the decision is immune from attack. The burden is on
the party opposing the committee's decision to make a prima
facie showing that the committee was not disinterested or in2
dependent, or that the decision was reached in bad faith.18
Thus, it will be difficult for strike suit plaintiffs to pursue frivolous claims in court. In addition, the number of suits initiated
by attorneys motivated by the hope of recovering fees should
decline as the prospects for prevailing on the merits diminish.
Finally, because judicial review will not reach the substantive
basis of the claim, the cost of defending such an action is significantly decreased, thereby reducing the nuisance value of the
sUit.183

The authorization of a committee, empowered to dismiss
shareholder's derivative suits, is justified on both legal and
public policy grounds. The new Act enables corporations to
deal effectively with strike suits, by properly recognizing that
the decision to dismiss a derivative suit is within the managerial prerogatives of the business's directors. In addition, by requiring that the litigation committee's decision be made by
179. Id. at 663, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
180. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.

181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1979);
Note, supra note 130, at 630.
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disinterested directors in good faith, the new Act adequately
protects the legitimate interests of shareholders.
V. FREEZE OUT MERGERS
The new Act allows corporations to engage in three types
of fundamental change: merger with another corporation, exchange of shares with another corporation, and transfer of assets.184 The most important modification of any fundamental
change is the rejection of the "business purpose" doctrine developed in Delaware185 and apparently adopted in Minnesota.' 86 The language of the new Act expressly authorizes a
merger without an underlying business purpose: "Any two or
more corporations may merge, resulting in a single corporation,
with or without a business purpose ... .-"187
The business purpose doctrine developed in response to
the recent phenomenon of mergers designed to eliminate the
publicly-held equity interests of minority investors, namely,
"going private" mergers. 88 The rising stock prices of the bull
market of the 1960's induced many previously privately-held
corporations to seek public equity financing, or to "go public."' 189 The falling stock prices of the bear market of the 1970's
provided the majority shareholders of many publicly-held corporations with an opportunity to regain sole ownership of the
corporation at a low cost.190 The majority shareholders' voting
power enabled them to force the publicly-held corporation to
merge into a corporation owned solely by the majority, with the
184. MINN. STAT. § 302A.601 (Supp. 1981).
185. Prior to any significant Delaware decisions, the federal courts attempted to use section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1980), and Rule lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), to graft a "business purpose" doctrine on
the federal securities laws. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 553 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974);
Note, Seeking a Legal Basisfor the Valid CorporatePurpose in Going Private
Mergers, 12 CREIGHToN L. Rmv. 629, 629, 634-636 (1979). This movement was
stopped when the United States Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977), eliminated federal securities laws as a basis for the
"business purpose" doctrine.
186. Minnesota arguably adopted the doctrine in the unreported district
court opinion in Bird v. Wirtz, affid on other grounds, 266 N.W.2d 166 (Minn.
1978). M Nr.STAT. ANN.§ 302A.601 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
187. MWm. STAT. § 302A.601(1) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
188. Brudney, A Note on "GoingPrivate," 61 VA. L REv. 1019, 1019-21 (1975);
Note, supra note 185, at 629.
189. Brudney, supra note 188, at 1019.
190. Id.
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minority "frozen out" of equity participation in the new corporation and paid off in cash or debt securities.19' Under the business purpose doctrine, a merger undertaken solely to eliminate
the interest of the minority shareholders is invalid for lack of
92
an underlying business purpose.1
Delaware, in Singer v. Magnavox Co.,193 was the first state
court to apply the doctrine. In Singer, North American Philips
Corporation had acquired, through a tender offer, approximately eighty-four percent of the outstanding common stock of
Magnavox. North American Philips then formed T.M.C. Development Corporation and merged Magnavox into T.M.C., paying
all minority shareholders in cash and retaining sole equity
ownership of T.M.C. The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of
Magnavox, filed suit to nullify the merger on numerous
grounds, including an allegation of fraud based on the majority's lack of a business purpose. 9 4 The Delaware Supreme
Court held that a merger must be based on a business purpose,
explaining that a desire to eliminate minority equity interests
does not meet that standard.195 The business purpose doctrine,
according to the court, is a logical consequence of the duty of
the majority shareholders to the minority.19 6
Elaborating on Singer, one commentator suggested that because the majority shareholders are subject to a fiduciary standard when dealing with the property of the minority, they may
not freeze out the minority without a legitimate business purpose.19 7 Such a freeze-out inevitably will damage the minority's
interest. 98 The notion that minority shareholders are harmed
in every freeze-out merger stems from a recognition that minority shareholders have an interest in both the form and the
value of their investment. 9 9 In Singer, for example, the court
rejected the majority's argument that it had satisfied its fiduci191. Such a merger may be accomplished by the use of a "shell" corporation or by a parent-subsidiary transaction. Brudney, supra note 188, at 1020.
192. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
193. 380 A.2d 969 (Del.1977); see supra note 185.
194. 380 A.2d at 972.
195. Id. at 980. Singer involved a long form merger. In Roland Int'l Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), the Delaware court extended the business purpose doctrine to encompass short form mergers.
196. 380 A.2d at 976.
197. McBride, Delaware CorporateLaw: JudicialScrutiny of Mergers-The
Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAw. 2231, 2233 (1978).
198. Id.
199. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 977-78; Note, Fairnessin Freeze Out
Transactions, 69 Ky. L.J. 77, 99 (1980); see Note, Elimination of Minority Share
4:
Interest by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 629 (1960).
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ary duty by offering a fair price for the minority shareholders'
interest. 200 The court also stressed that the terms of the
merger were inadequate because no equity ownership in the
corporation was offered as a part of the minority's compensation.201 Thus, the Singer court rejected the common law rule
that the minority shareholders were harmed only if the value of
2 2
their investments was confiscated. 0
Subsequent Delaware decisions 2 03 have affirmed the use of
the business purpose test, as have courts in Indiana, 20 4 New
York205 and other jurisdictions. 2 06 Although none of these
opinions have adequately defined the term "business purpose, '20 7 the requirement suggests that the purpose must be legitimate or bona fide.20 8 Significantly, courts assessing the
legitimacy of a purported business purpose do not treat the
business judgment of the directors with as much deference as
they accord it in other areas of corporate law.2 09 Moreover, the
courts are not clear on exactly whose business purpose satisfies the test. In one instance, the Delaware court upheld a
merger in furtherance of the business purpose of the majority
2
shareholder. 10
200. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 977.
201. Id.
202. See Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 73 Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d
785, 789 (1958), cffld, 38,Del. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959) (example of common law
position); McBride, supra note 197, at 2235.
203. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 395 (Del. Ch. 1978); Young v. Valhi, Inc.,
382 A.2d 1372, 1376 (DeL Ch. 1978).
204. Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977) (court
refused to specifically accept Singer but held that a merger must have a valid
business purpose).
205. The decisions of the New York courts indicate a movement toward a
business purpose standard. Note, An Apologyfor the Unwanted Public Shareholder: The Business Purpose Test and the Freeze-Out Merger, 4 J. CoRp. L. 97,
116-17 (1978); see Clark v. Pattern Analysis Recognition Corp., 87 Misc.2d 385,
384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schuwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.2d 292, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
206. See Note, supra note 199, at 102-03.
207. Note, supra note 205, at 117; Note, Short-Form Merger in Missouri:Potential Problems ForMinority Shareholders, 46 Mo. L. REV. 195, 222 (1981).
208. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 395 (Del. Ch.
1978).
209. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977); see also supra
text accompanying notes 177-82 for a discussion of the business judgment rule
as applied to review of shareholder's derivative suits by special litigation
committees.
210. In Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1978), the
parent merged a wholly owned subsidiary into a subsidiary of which it owned
81%, eliminating minority shareholder's interests. Using Singer as its basis,
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The new Act rejects the business purpose doctrine. The
business purpose doctrine seems to require a court to examine
the facts and circumstances of each case,2 11 since "it is clear
that [a] business purpose which is sufficient to justify some
mergers may not be sufficient in different circumstances." 212
The uncertainty associated with the judicial review of mergers
has increased their cost and has possibly chilled some goingprivate transactions. 213 Chapter 302A avoids these undesirable
effects by eliminating the business purpose requirement. 2 14
Moreover, the rejection of the business purpose doctrine and
the underlying fiduciary duty of majority shareholders is in accord with the new Act's overall goal of decreased interference
in corporate management. 215 The new Act recognizes that the
majority shareholders fulfill their duty to the minority if the
majority offers the minority a fair price for their shares. Because the scope of the majority's fiduciary duty is thus limited
to the price offer for the minority's shares, appraisal is the only
216
available remedy under the new Act for an unfair price.
Commentators have argued that the real danger to minority shareholders in a merger is that they may receive an inadequate price for their interest.217 Nevertheless, although they
argue that an inadequate price is the major danger, they reject
the court upheld the freeze out merger because the elimination of the minority
interests facilitated long term debt financing for the parent corporation. Id. at
387.
211. McBride, supra note 197, at 2246-50.
212. Id. at 2249.
213. Note, supra note 185, at 652-53 n.179 (citing Brudney, supra note 188,
Singer, and other authorities).
214. MIN. STAT. § 302A.601(1) (Supp. 1981).
215. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
216. 'The remedy for lack of 'entire fairness' in the transaction in this act is
the appraisal section; by obtaining the fair value of the shares, the dissenting
minority shareholder recoups the investment." MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.601 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). Appraisal proceedings are available to shareholders who dissent from a "plan of merger to which the corporation is a
party." MiNN. STAT. § 302A.471(1) (c) (Supp. 1981). Upon proper notice from the
dissenting shareholder or after the merger takes effect, the corporation must
remit the fair value of the dissenting shareholder's interest. Id. § 302A.473(5).
The dissenter must then demand any supplemental payment due to an improper determination of fair value by the corporation. Id. § 302A.473(6). If the
corporation and dissenting shareholder do not agree on the fair value, the dissenter may petition the court for a valuation. In that valuation, the court is free
to "determine the fair value of the shares, taking into account any and all factors the court finds relevant, computed by any method or combination of methods that the court, in its discretion, sees fit to use." Id. § 302A.473(7).
217. See Brudney &Chirelstein, A Restatement of CorporateFreeze Outs, 87
YALE L.J. 1354, 1361, 1364, 1368 (1978), Note, supra note 205, at 101.
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the utility of appraisal as the sole remedy. 218 Moreover, they reject the use of the business purpose test as a measure of the
fairness or validity of the mdrger.219 In a merger involving a
large, publicly-held corporation with numerous small minority
interests, this assessment is probably correct-the possibility
of an inadequate price is the primary danger.2 20 Such investors
generally are indifferent regarding the form of the compensation they receive if the value of their investment is conserved.
These investors would remain indifferent to the results of a
freeze-out merger, provided that the majority paid a fair price
for the investment and another investment with an equal or
greater return was available.
Some considerations, however, may make the form of the
compensation important to investors. 221 Federal and state income taxes may affect the net value that the minority shareholders receive. Although the exchange of shares completing
the merger is tax free to the majority, the payment of cash and
debt securities to the minority may well be a realization of income and thus a taxable event.222 Even if the majority pays the
full value of the minority interest, the minority may be at a
short-run disadvantage due to these tax consequences. In addition, minority investors in a closely held corporation may lose
2 23
the less tangible values of an interest in the investment.
Under the new Act, the minority investor in a closely-held corporation may be frozen out and left in the same position as a
minority investor in a publicly-held corporation, with appraisal
218. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 217, at 1368.
219. Id. at 1368, 1376.
220. But see Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 n.8 (Del. 1977) (citing
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Cal. Super. Ct. C-. 000268 (Nov. 19, 1975), in which the
court listed some of the stakes involved in an investor beyond the simple investment value).
221. Note, Corporate Freezeouts: A New Limitation Imposed by the "Entire
Fairness"Standard, 1978 U. IiL. L.F. 686, 698-9. One possible loss to the minority shareholders is the expense and risk of finding alternate investments.
Brudney, supra note 188, at 1023. Another loss to the minority is the "synergistic gain" accruing to the majority by virtue of the economies of only having one
corporation (as in a parent-subsidiary merger) or no longer having to file reports as a publicly-held corporation. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 217, at
1371-1375 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)).
222. See LR.C. § 354(a) (1) (1976); Note, supra note 221, at 698 n.85.
223. See Note, supra note 199, at 99 (supporting an analytical distinction between publicly and closely held corporations); Note, CorporateFreeze-OutsEffected by Merger, The Search for a Rule, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 115, 130 (1975)
(same).
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as the sole remedy. 224 The conversion of the minority interest
to cash may deprive shareholders of a proprietary interest in
the corporation or force them to part with an investment with
other sentimental value.225
The business purpose doctrine afforded minority shareholders some protection from these otherwise uncompensated
losses. Although the rejection of the doctrine will result in less
226
a porinterference in the internal affairs of the corporation,
tion of the protection afforded to minority shareholders is no
longer available.227 The net value of the rejection of the business purpose doctrine depends on the magnitude of interference in corporate affairs compared with the magnitude of the
harm caused by the decreased protection for minority
shareholders.
The rejection of the business purpose doctrine should entail significant gains for the business community. To that extent, the statute is a desirable development. The application of
the doctrine was too uncertain to be a useful guide to business
activity. The decreased protection afforded minority shareholders by the new Act, however, mandates that the courts pay
careful attention to the value paid to holders of minority interests. 228 In the absence of judicial attitudes encouraging liberal
valuations for the shareholders opting for appraisal, the overall
effect of the rejection of the business purpose doctrine will be
to unduly increase the power of majority shareholders in dealings with the minority.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 302A represents a reasonable accommodation of
224. The new Act applies identically to both closely and publicly held corporations. ADVISORY COmi. REP., supra note 3, at VIII.
225. See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Cal. Super. Ct. C.A. 000268 (Nov. 19, 1975),
cited in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 n.8 (Del. 1977).
226. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
227. The business purpose doctrine does not provide direct protection
against an inadequate offer price for the shares of the minority. In Tanzer, the
court spoke of an "entire fairness" approach in which the price was only a factor in the court's determination of fairness. 402 A.2d 382, 387-89 (Del. Ch. 1978).
228. A liberal valuation in appraisal proceedings is one possible solution to
the problem of uncompensated losses. The problems associated with uncompensated tax consequences or intangible losses make a more specific guide impracticable. Although different shareholders have different problems, policies
of equity demand that those minority shareholders in the same merger with
holdings of similar size receive the same amount. In the final analysis, the only
proper admonition is that courts make liberal valuations cognizant of the disadvantages inherent in the minority shareholder's position.

1066

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1033

the state's interest in regulating corporate activity and the requirements of corporate self-governance. The new Act has reformed corporate law by eliminating many of the unnecessary
formalities associated with corporate formation, governance,
merger, and dissolution. Moreover, the new Act provides corporate management with much needed flexibility while protecting shareholders from the most blatant abuses of corporate
power. In its sections on merger and special litigation committees, the new Act correctly recognizes that the directors, rather
than the shareholders or the courts, are best able to make decisions concerning the management of the corporations. Nevertheless, the new claim bar and buy-out provisions should help
to protect shareholder's legitimate interests in receiving a fair
and certain return on their investments. By incorporating
these and other revisions, the new Act makes Minnesota law
more responsive to the realities of contemporary business
practices.

